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Abstract. Many security scenarios involve both network and crypto-
graphic protocols and the interactions of dierent human participants in
a real-world environment. Modelling these scenarios is complex, in part
due to the imprecision and underspecication of the tasks and proper-
ties involved. We present work-in-progress on a domain-specic modelling
approach for such scenarios; the approach is intended to support coarse-
grained state exploration, and incorporates a classication of elements
complementary to computer protocols, such as the creation, personal-
isation, modication and transport of identity tokens. We propose the
construction of a domain-specic language for capturing these elements,
which will in turn support domain-specic analyses related to the relia-
bility and modiability of said scenarios.
1 Introduction
We present a work-in-progress report on modelling security scenarios beyond
the level of the network and cryptographic protocols to the level of human inter-
actions with the security components. This work is an application of a coarse-
grained state exploration approach that incorporates a classication of elements
that are complementary computer protocols, such as the creation, personalisa-
tion, modication and transport of identity tokens. The present conceptual work
for these attributes is currently being implemented as a domain-specic language
(DSL) in a modelling and simulation framework.
Current research has looked at security scenarios in detail regarding the com-
puting aspects; however, there has been low focus on the types of attacks that
can happen in a physical environment involving human users. The following
scenario demonstrates one such case:
Alice applies for, and is issued, an identication card from her local
municipality. The card is couriered to Alice's home address. This card
will be used by Alice in various businesses and services in the community.
With many of the transactions, such as applying for a tax certicate for
her car, a clerk, Bob, will take Alice's card, and check it for various pieces
of information. Bob the clerk at the tax oce uses card as a means of
verifying Alice's claims of things about herself (e.g., name, age).
In this scenario, it is insucient to consider only attacks on the cryptographic
and networking components. For instance, there are potential problems with
physical consistency throughout the system. If Alice has an identication card,
it must have been created and sent to her. There are points along that value
chain where attacks of opportunity can happen. The person issuing the card
could make an error about Alice's age, or a courier taking the card to Alice
could lose it. It is also possible that the courier could actively try to take and
use Alice's card to obtain a service to which he is not entitled.
Within such scenarios, beliefs also play a role; this is because in some of the
activities within the scenario, two or more actors are involved, and each may
have a dierent set of behaviours in that context. For example, while Bob might
believe the information on the identication card when Alice uses it, he may be
less likely to believe it when the courier is using the card.
All of these situations lead to a complex set of properties that must be
represented in any system hoping to model security risks that may arise from
execution of a scenario.
This line of work was originally motivated by the UK's Identity Cards Act
2006 (now repealed). The type of question we were interested in trying to an-
swer was: Given a scenario, what dierence do particular congurations of that
scenario make to the outcome? More concretely, in our example above, does the
existence and use of an identication card make enough of a dierence to the
identication decisions the clerk, Bob, has to make to justify its additional cost?
To help to answer such questions, we would benet from an infrastructure
that can describe and test assertions about identication scenarios. This paper
contributes our work-in-progress to modelling the elements of scenarios beyond
the network and cryptographic protocols.
2 Modelling security scenarios
We outline the overall approach taken to modelling scenarios like the identica-
tion example presented earlier. In general, these are scenarios with (informally)
some element of fuzziness to them | specically, scenarios which can be cong-
ured and where the decisions within are taken based on probability distributions.
We present a high-level overview of the model, starting with its requirements and
then presenting its key entities.
2.1 Requirements for the modelling approach
The requirements for our modelling approach are as follows. They are expressed
assuming that we wish to exploit, as much as possible, model checking ap-
proaches, so as to use proven technology. We have three simulation or explo-
ration requirements concerning automated exploration, probabilistic evaluation
and simulation of individual paths through the scenario, as well as a need for a
DSL.
Automated exploration We want to analyse every possible path through the
scenario. This is akin to model checking (using tools such as FDR2 [8] or
SPIN [25]), and is necessary for completeness.
Probabilistic evaluation When exploring every path, we want to assess how
likely it is to occur. It is very unlikely that an agent will sell alcohol (under
jurisdictional restrictions) to a 5 year old, yet someone who appears to be
over 21 is unlikely to be challenged. This makes the scenarios fuzzy, requiring
parameterisation. Such parameters might include
{ a probability density function of the age of a subject;
{ a probability density function giving an agent's perception of the sub-
ject's age, given her actual age.
Individual path simulation For validation and understanding of the model,
we would like to be able to step through particular paths. We anticipate
increasingly complex scenarios, and individual path simulations are a useful
counterpoint to the complete automated exploration.
Domain-specic We could build a simulation in any computer language. To
make it understandable and usable, we require something specic to the
problem domain. It has to understand that there are actors and objects,
that actors can show objects (e.g., identity cards) to other actors, etc.
Additionally, the set up of a scenario is a distinct and complicated step.
Concretely, does the subject remember to take her identity card with her?
How were they issued? We could take this a step further and simulate the
issue and delivery of such credentials. This bootstrap has to be included in
the scenario, as it gives opportunities for people to make mistakes, others to
intercept credentials, and so on.
One approach to better enable the construction and validation of scenarios is
to provide a domain-specic language, specically dened and constrained to
support exactly and only the concepts and logic for describing scenarios. If we
are able to dene such a DSL, capturing just the concepts of scenarios (and
their semantics), we ideally make it easier for end-users (who may be security
experts) to specify relevant and meaningful scenarios of interest, and provide
greater condence that said scenarios are acceptable and valid. Moreover, if
the DSL is specied and implemented in an appropriate way (e.g., using
Eclipse EMF or other similar modelling technologies), automated tools can
be developed, such as editors, that end-users can apply in constructing and
checking their scenarios. Such convenience facilities, while not essential, can
add further condence that well-formed scenarios have been constructed.
2.2 Concepts and denitions
The model we present has been adapted from scenario based design proposed by
Carroll and Rosson [24] for the design of interactive systems. Essentially, we are
simulating actors (the subject, the agent) interacting with dierent components
of the system, and the events that occur in response to those interactions. These
concepts were identied by sketching use cases of a series of scenarios.
People and actors can be classied within a scenario thus
Subject An individual that initiates or triggers a scenario; often a user or cus-
tomer (e.g., a person being identied). In police or immigration-related sce-
narios, the subject is a person being identied.
Imposter A person masquerading as a subject (whether the subject actually
exists or not).
Cheat A subject who is attempting to convince an agent that they hold a
property that in fact they do not. For example, a cheat may try to convince
an agent that they are of a particular age when they are not. We distinguish
a cheat from an Imposter, who attempts to impersonate a dierent subject.
Agent A representative (e.g., sales assistant, police ocer) of an organisation
that interacts with the subject.
Actor A generic term covering all the roles above, as well as others not explicitly
noted. For example, in an identication scenario, a particular subject could
be using another actor's identication tokens.
We need to model a memory for all actors. This represents their prior beliefs,
current impressions, their understanding of an encounter so far, and so on.
In section 4, we fold these into properties, i.e., the memory of an actor is
a property of the actor, simply to reduce the amount of terminology and
dierent elds in the formal denitions. A further possibility is to consider
forgetfulness as another source of errors or protocol problems.
Agents may act on behalf of an organisation:
Organisations. An organisation owns artefacts of values, and has represen-
tatives (agents) that engage in scenarios. Organisations wish to ascertain
whether subjects hold properties related to artefacts of value. Some of these
organisations will issue identity cards; others may courier or deliver items,
cards, etc.
Some scenarios involve identity cards, e.g., national identity cards, passports,
driving licences, PASScards, which involve the following entity types:
Genuine card A genuine (non-forged) identity card: it may be held by the
subject, or by an imposter. Additionally, it may be a card that an im-
poster has persuaded the issuer to wrongly issue. Genuine cards may be
faulty in some sense, e.g., smartcard chips may have been damaged (delib-
erately/maliciously or accidentally) and not operate.
Forged card An identity card that has not been issued by the issuer.
Tampered card A genuine card that has been tampered with, e.g., to modify
the photograph. (Both forging and tampering with credentials is well-known
in practice.)
Card terminal A card reader, that incorporates a slot or interface for the
genuine or forged card, a key pad for entering PINs and a display to direct
the user. Some terminals may be able to take biometric readings.
We could further address the issue of corrupted terminals in this work |
such terminals could skim the card, attempt to retain other data such as
the subject's PIN or biometric reading, or give misleading information on a
display. There are other problems that can be investigated here, many similar
to ATMs, such as whether subjects have good cause to trust terminals. How
can they know the terminal is not corrupt? What stops someone `shoulder-
surng' to obtain a PIN?
Objects A generic term covering all the items above, as well as any others re-
quired in a particular scenario. Other services (the two examples immediately
below) are encoded into the objects that provide access to those services.
Verication and CRL services Cards can be veried via terminals. These
may be on- or o-line, and thus network and cryptographic protocols are re-
quired. Some services could perhaps be used for the identication of subjects
who are not carrying credentials.
Communication links Terminals must be able to communicate with both an
organisation's computers and verication services. In the same way that we
need to model the couriering of cards from issuer to subject, communication
between computers is mediated by these links.
Within a scenario, actors (e.g., subjects, agents) interact, sometimes using
particular artefacts (e.g., items of value such as ID cards). Some interactions are
constrained by location: for example, a subject cannot show an identity card to
an agent if they are not both in the same location. As such, the model has to
support constraints in scenarios.
The sketch use cases that produced the concepts above also produced possible
operations applicable to concepts and congurations. Operations are interpreted
as events resulting in state changes. Specically, the operations identied are:
pick up and drop an object from or into a location; give an object to another
actor (presumably in the same location, e.g., a courier); say to another actor
(e.g., to trigger some transaction); show an object to another actor; set a prop-
erty or belief; and, move between locations. Many of these are relatively simple
in terms of state change and modelling. say and set are substantially more
complicated, as they can be used as \escape hatches" to implement relatively
complicated interactions.
There is one further class of entity that we need to describe: attackers.
2.3 Attackers
We have used Casper [15] as an inspiration for some of this work; so we require
an analogue of the most general intruder. In one sense, this is partially covered
in the Actors described above (e.g., Imposter and Cheat).
A more specialised treatment may allow our analysis to produce emergent,
unanticipated results. So an attacker may be involved in
{ the interception of credentials in transit, similar to the missing-in-post prob-
lem for delivery of credit cards;
{ theft and robbery: simply taking items from a location or another actor;
{ interacting with other attackers. There may be multiple actors behaving as
attackers. This interaction could involve cooperation or even competition
Fig. 1. Example cumulative density function for an o-licence subject's age.
between attackers. Indeed, some systems may not trust their expected sub-
jects (such as ecash services, where the system has to prevent the subjects
adding extra value without payment).
3 Fuzziness and probabilities
Nondeterminism is inherent in this work. When an actor sees another actor, they
both form impressions about the other. In scenarios where ages are important,
an actor will assess another's age as being approximately the correct age, but
we assert that this is likely to be a normal distribution. When close to a legal
boundary, this can be important. As an example, we might use a simple trapezoid
to describe the probability distribution of the actual age of subjects attending an
o-licence, as illustrated in gure 1. The agent who has to determine the subject's
age will have a probability density function giving her estimate of the subject's
age given the actual age, for example, gure 2. This particular example illustrates
the need for dierent congurations of a scenarios |the likely distributions may
vary according to the particular deployment| and the need for validation.
Similarly, when confronted with a photographic credential and an actor as-
serting to be the person in the photograph, the likelihood of the verier accepting
that identication depends on the quality of the credential, the dierence in time,
changes in appearance, the diligence of the verier and the skill of the verier.
Fig. 2. Example probability density function for an o-licence scenario. a denotes the
subject's actual age, ma is the perceived age and ama pdf is the probability.
Alternatively, an automated device may be involved, such as in the current gen-
eration of some eGates at national borders and services such as face.com. Such
matters can be modelled as nondeterminism.
A nal source of nondeterminism in our scenarios is mistakes. Humans make
errors. Some may simply not care or be less diligent than other actors. But we
cannot guarantee that the actors in our scenarios will follow protocols faith-
fully; indeed, the point of our work is that actors cannot always follow protocols
perfectly.
4 Formal denitions
Given the concepts, congurations, notions of constraints, and operations, a
formalisation of the model (in, e.g., Z) is straightforward. We now give a more
formal description of scenario, state and event.
A scenario is a tuple (A;B;O;L; P;E; s; ee; ea) where
Fig. 3. States model. Fig. 4. Events model.
{ A is a set of actors;
{ B is a set of (passive) objects;
{ O is a set of organisations;
{ L is a set of locations;
{ P is a set of properties (which include, for example, if an identity document
has been modied and the beliefs that an actor may form about another
actor or their memories);
{ E is a set of possible events;
{ s is a sequence of events that set up the scenario; and
{ ee and ea are functions over a state of the simulation evaluating the expected
and actual outcomes.
We illustrate this in gures 3 and 4.
A state is a tuple (l; i; r; q) where
{ l : A 7! L gives the locations of the actors;
{ i : B 7! L [A gives the location containing or actor holding each object;
{ r : A[B[O[L 7! P gives the properties associated with the actors, objects,
organisations and locations; and
{ q is a priority queue of pending events. They are prioritised as
immediate contains events that should happen as soon as possible, such as
an actor's reaction to another actor's action;
delayed contains events with a natural delay, such as movement, or posting
an item. These happen after all immediate events; and
deferred contains events relating to the simulation management.
l, i and r are partial functions, which allows for an actor or object to not be
present at all and for only desired properties to be selected.
Finally, an event is a conventional transition on a state (l; i; r; q) resulting in
one or more new states (l0; i0; r0; q0). The operational view of an event is that the
head of q is processed according to its denition. The processing of an event may
add additional events to the queue; some of these additional events are implicit
in the design, for example, the arrival of an actor might cause a second actor to
carry out some action, which itself is represented by enqueuing further events.
Where more than one state results, the transition is associated with either a
xed probability (e.g., 0.6) or an abstraction of a random variable to handle
nondeterminism; again this is dened by the event.
Given a scenario (A;B;O;L; P;E; s; ee; ea), we create an initial state (;; ;; ;; s).
Conguration may slightly adjust initial events or probability distributions (e.g., in
our running example, identity cards may not be available at all). From the initial
state, we select the rst event and this results in a subsequent state or subse-
quent states: thus our model may end up with multiple current states if we are
attempting an exhaustive exploration instead of concentrating on only one suc-
cessor at a time. We repeat this for each subsequent state until the queue of
pending events is empty in each current state, at which point we evaluate ee and
ea to determine the outcome of each terminal state.
One particular issue is that the rich state, in part resulting from modelling
actors' memories, turns what might have been a fairly large digraph into a tree
for all but the most trivial scenarios. Thus traditional model checking approaches
are problematic.
5 Domain-Specic Language
We aim to rene and implement this model using a domain-specic language; this
will allow us to capture scenarios (involving actors, etc) and will support end-
users |who may be identication specialists, security experts, software engineers
or business specialists| in expressing scenarios and validating them. Building
a suitable DSL is therefore a way of implementing our scenario-based approach.
Our rationale for constructing a DSL as opposed to simply implementing the
model in, e.g., an object-oriented programming language, is that a DSL-based
approach allows us to capture only essential concepts, thus making it easier to
validate the scenarios (and underlying model) that we produce.
As is the case with the design of any language, we want our scenario DSL
to be suciently expressive while practical: it should allow end-users to capture
the full scope of a scenario without the underlying model being too large to
meaningfully analyse.
The DSL has to capture the actors, objects, etc. It must also deal with
constraints, such as an actor can only give an object to another actor if they are
both in the same location; and responses, such as an actor responding to another
saying something. Some of these should be implicit to the simulation and are
generic (e.g., give) whereas others are likely to be specic to each scenario.
We could consider the separate phases of a scenario. For example, we might
view bootstrap and an encounter of a subject and agent as being two phases.
Complex scenarios may have more than two phases. Splitting them into distinct
phases allows more reusability. Similarly, the conguration must be captured,
for example, is a particular type of identify credential available in this run?
We need to describe the outcomes we are testing. At its simplest, the simu-
lation knows what the correct outcome is: it knows whether or not the subject
should be able to carry out whatever transaction they are requesting. Thus we
can simple enumerate possible outcomes and compare true/false positive/negative
outcomes for dierent congurations. However, there are further characteristics
we might wish to check: a signicant one relates to privacy and information
leakage. Does a particular conguration make it easier for one actor to obtain
(unnecessary) information about another?
Some form of overloading is desirable: some behaviours of actors will be
generic, yet the actors will also need scenario-specic and even conguration-
specic behaviours and responses.
Lastly, we must describe the attacker(s) behaviour. Can someone misbehave
in this scenario? What emergent behaviours might we see?
6 Related work
Much of the motivation for this work concerns simulation or model checking of
scenarios involving humans and identity, where identity is a property of entities
that allows entities to be distinguished from each other. Sometimes humans are
attempting to identify another individual, or are instead carrying out the task
of verication. Sometimes a computer or network is involved, perhaps as an
intermediary between two humans, or in place of one of the parties.
Precise denitions of `identity' can be controversial [3]. In this case, it is
recognising an individual which degenerates (in our examples) to unique naming.
Identication is the process of establishing an entity's identity via a particular
mechanism (or set of mechanisms), e.g., comparison to a trusted repository of
identities. Of course, dierent actors will have dierent assessments of the trust
of any particular repository.
Current identication practices are varied, and can involve a vendor mak-
ing a judgement as to age, or accepting other documents that may never have
been intended for this purpose. The notorious example here is the use of utility
bills for identication. Government-issue ID such as driving licences (particularly
photocard variants) and passports are popular, as are third-party schemes such
as the Proof of Age Standards Scheme.
The systematic approach proposed is similar to the use of Casper [15] but
involves other aspects such as the actors in the scenario, the physical movement
of credentials, and so on. Interruptions and modications can occur, involving
such behaviours as intercepting a document so that a third party can use it, or
the intended recipient modifying it to support dierent claims such as a dierent
age.
At a high level, this work has some relation to what are sometimes called
\serious games", such as military simulations and wargames, public order models
and re/evacuation models (as exemplied by Galea's group at Greenwich).
Looking more closely at actors, there are classic belief-desire-intention models
and competency models (in the context of training, learning, assessment and
development) which could have inuence on development of our work.
The most closely related work we are aware of is due to Martina and Car-
los [16], where they describe the same type of issue, i.e., that security protocols
need to take into account the environment. This necessarily includes the inter-
action of humans. Subsequent work [6] presents rst steps to an Isabelle/HOL
model, which distinguishes the work from our attempts at a simulational and
model-checking model.
Ideally, we would like to exploit domain-specic validation and analysis toolsets
such as Lowe's Casper [15], which is itself based on FDR2 [8]. However we also
desire a way to simulate individual runs of a scenario. This is to allow us to
explain and further understand how individual results might come about. Thus,
our current prototype simply enumerates every possible run (every trace in pro-
cess algebra terms) by brute force, but also allows us to run this in an interactive
mode (as in FDR2 vs. Probe [21]). Other notations and tools could also be con-
sidered. We could enhance our CSPsim [5], but this will likely involve a signicant
amount of eort for proof-of-concept, as it would require us to extend the formal
model and the model checker, when we are at a stage of evaluating whether the
approach to scenario modelling provides benet.
Tools such as PRISM [13] potentially can be applied to such problems. It has
a rich language capturing a range of probabilistic features (from simple prob-
abilities for nondeterministic choice to variants of Markov chains), with a tool
that allows exhaustive calculation and path simulation. However, it does not
allow potentially expensive exhaustive exploration to be performed and then
repeatedly re-calculated for the probabilistic calculations (as in our current pro-
totype). Confusingly, there is another tool called PRISM [1] based on Prolog.
Programs for this tool are logic programs in which facts have a parameterised
probability distribution: this is very similar to the mechanics of the approach
we have adopted in our work. A dierence is that it does not support exhaus-
tive exploration of the scenarios. Similar reasoning applies to considerations of
tools such as SPIN [25]. However, state-rich formalisms such as Event-B [2] or
Alloy [12] may provide a sensible basis for supporting rich simulations, but these
require extensions to associate probability distributions with events (and hence
interactions). Other more simulation-oriented tools include Anylogic [28] and
Demos2k [17]. A useful list of such tools is available from Rizzoli [22]. Mona-
han's DXM [17] is notable for using a Monte Carlo style of modelling. Lanotte
et al. [14] outline an analytical approach using probabilistic transition systems.
These tools and approaches, with suitable extensions, could support analysis
of probabilistic models as described in this paper, but we would then lose the
benet of using model checking infrastructure to support analysis outside of
exhaustive state exploration.
The model used in this paper is inspired by fuzzy logic [29] and probabilistic
logics. Signicant tool support for modelling fuzzy logic-based scenarios was pro-
vided by XFuzzy [18], which included a specication language as well as rules for
manipulating linguistic variables. XFuzzy focused on analysing block diagrams
rather than scenarios, making it unsuitable for problems like those considered
in this paper. There has also been extension to logics for reasoning about prob-
ability; besides the state machine models underpinning PRISM, extensions to
renement calculi [20] and formal specication languages (e.g., Event-B [19])
have been proposed.
The work in this paper is related to that of reasoning in the presence of
uncertainty, e.g., as exemplied by research on analysis incomplete or inconsis-
tent requirements specications. Most noteworthy here is work on the XCheck
model checker [7] which provides a multi-valued symbolic model checker; such a
model checker provides probabilistic support but not support for reasoning with
probability distriutions and for manipulating congurations of scenarios.
Substantial work has been carried out on the design and implementation of
DSLs; [26] is a comprehensive reference, and many of the important design prin-
ciples and technical patterns for implementing DSLs are discussed in [9]. DSLs
are typically dened to support modelling of a particular problem domain, to
address a particular engineering tasks (e.g., a form of analysis), or to enable par-
ticular stakeholder groups to more easily express their concerns. DSLs have been
constructed in a number of ways, including via embedding of a DSL in another,
more general-purpose language, and through abstraction of other languages.
A signicant example of the latter approach is MetaBorg [4], which is a
transformation-based approach for the denition of embedded textual DSLs im-
plemented based on the Stratego framework. The MetaBorg approach denes
new concepts by mapping them to expansions in the host language. MetaBorg
was designed for textual languages. This means that the transformations in-
volved can be expressed by means of transformations on abstract syntax trees
rather than abstract syntax graphs. Stratego is also used in [10] to develop an
external DSL for web development.
The underlying notion of an embedded DSL seems to have been discussed
rst by Hudak [11]. The idea of forwarding that is now a standard technique
for dening embedded textual DSLs using attribute grammars was introduced
in [27].
7 Preliminary conclusions
We claim that it is possible to construct scenarios involving our desired properties
in such as way that they can be explored and produce useful results, at least for
comparing dierent congurations. A major diculty of the work is to properly
set the scope: too small and it's not expressive enough; too large and we can
perform no analysis. A research question here is: Can we nd a viable scope
for interesting scenarios? Routine scenarios are easy: they involve all the actors
behaving \correctly" and no attackers. Yet the interesting scenarios are where
people make mistakes and others are actively attacking the system.
The DSL is currently being elaborated to provide more detail. Our next
step is to present a more elaborate and rigorous denition of the DSL, perhaps
using Eclipse-based EMF tools, and implement a suitable model-to-text trans-
formation that enables compilation, analysis and simulation via state-of-the-art
simulation tools. A prototype implementation in Python (with unvalidated pa-
rameters) suggests a one or two percentage point dierence in true/false pos-
itive/negative outcomes between dierent congurations of an age-related sce-
nario that might have used ID cards. As a result, we suspect that the actors'
behaviour will swamp technical aspects of protocols, hence it is valuable to pur-
sue this line of work.
This work is closely related to the model checking of protocols. There are
necessarily assumptions about the protocol that the actors follow in particu-
lar scenario. Additionally, we have to consider the probabilities associated with
some decisions. As well as the general scenario correctness problem |however
we formulate a model, it will always be an abstraction of a real system| this
inclusion of probabilities adds additional validation problems. One approach is
to test the stability of any results under perturbation. If the results are unstable
under perturbation of the parameters, the validity of the model is questionable.
Automating this perturbation analysis would result in greater computational
demands.
Rich state gives us less scope to reduce the size of the state space because the
actors know their own history. As this history is part of the state, it is less likely
that there will be a signicant number of identical states following transitions.
Classical model checking approaches (e.g., FDR2 [8], SPIN [25]) or even lazy
approaches such as CSPsim [5] each have a restricted set of data types. A richer
simulation worsens this problem.
As an alternative, describing the scenario in an interactive ction environ-
ment such as TADS3 [23] would certainly satisfy the domain-specic and individ-
ual path simulation requirements, as well as adding rich simulation capabilities.
Automated exploration would require some work (e.g., a driver program), along
with a way to abstract the probability distributions. Canonicalisation is also
harder due to the opaque state within the interactive ction interpreter.
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